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JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred on the Court of Appeals by Utah Code
annotated 78-2a(2)(K) (1992)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES & CONTROLLING LAW

The following is presented to the court for review.

1- Did Judge Sawaya/the Third District Court err and rewrite a contract improvidently
entered into at arms length or change the bargain indirectly because of supposed
equitable principles by ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs. The Note at issue clearly does
not specify any semi annual payment amounts that were due, yet the court ruled that
specific semi- annual payments were not made, bringing the Note into default.
Dalton v. Jerico Construction Co., 642 P2d 748 (Utah 1982).

2. Did Judge Sawaya/the Third District Court err in granting the Plaintiffs a Summary
Judgment when there was a genuine issue of material fact.
"Summary Judgment is appropriate... when there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law". Winegar v. Froerer
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). "Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a
question of law." Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108; Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah division of
State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990); Gordon v. CRS Consulting
Engineers, 820 P2d 492 (Utah App 1991)
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"A Contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies." Winegar, 813 P2d at 108 (quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); CJ.Realty v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah App. 1988)

3. Did Judge Sawaya/the Third District Court err by ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs
when in fact it is a fundamental principle of contact law that "any uncertainty with
respect to construction of a contract should be resolved against the party who hafs]
drawn the agreement." Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982)
Wilburn, 748 P.2d at 585

4. Did Judge Sawaya/the Third District Court err by rendering a final judgment during
the pre-trial conference (after having already denied Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment) without any new evidence being brought forth? Is this the purpose and intent
of the pre-trial conference or was this a breach of Judicial Procedure? Utah code (1.08
(7)).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case has to do with an ambiguously worded second mortgage (real estate contract)
that was drafted by a real estate salesman. The Note makes mention of "Semi-Annual
Payments" but it does not stipulate any specific amounts nor does it identify if the
"payments" were to be made towards the principal, interest, or a combination of the
two. Consequently, one of the parties involved (the Plaintiffs, who were not the
original holders of the note) assumed that the payments were to be towards interest in a
specific amount while the other party (the Defendants) assumed that the payments were
optional payments towards principal.

Shortly after the transaction was originally consummated, the original holder of the
note subordinated it to William and Elvira Christopulos (the Plaintiffs/Appellees).
Within one to two months after the subordination, the Plaintiffs sent the Curtis' (the
Defendants/Appellants) a schedule of monthly payments. Said payment schedule was
not part of the original note and does not constitute a binding contract between the
Plaintiffs and the Defendants. Even if said payment schedule was a binding contract, it
also neglects to specify whether the payments were being made towards interest,
principal or a combination of the two and the payment amounts are not specified in the
Note.

The Defendants wanted to make payments towards the balloon payments from time to
time rather than make the total payments at the time they became due. They were
therefore willing to make semi annual payments for a time. The Dispute arose when the
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Defendants chose not to make a semi-annual payment and the Plaintiffs accused them
of being in default.

When the first balloon payment eventually came due, the Defendants tried to pay the
specified amount of the balloon payment minus the total amount of semi-annual
payments which had previously been paid towards principal but the Plaintiffs refused
said payment claiming that the previous payments were interest payments not principal
payments.

The Plaintiffs motioned for a Summary Judgment which was denied by Judge Sawaya
on 2/13/92. A non-Jury trial was set for 9/22/92 but during the pre-trial conference
Judge Sawaya told the Defendant in the presence of the Plaintiffs Legal Council that if
he (the Defendant) did not work out a settlement with the Plaintiffs, he would rule in
favor of the Plaintiffs at trial. The Judge admitted the Note was ambiguous but said he
could only assume what the intent of the note must have been.

Following the pretrial conference the Plaintiffs resubmitted a motion for Summary
Judgment which the Judge granted even though no new evidence had been presented.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

* On February 1st 1987 the Defendants, signed a trust deed note in the amount of
$13,500.00 constituting a second mortgage on a home located at 4284 South Albright
Dr. in Holiday Utah. The original holder of the note was Darrell B. Hincks.
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* The Defendants never met or personally dealt with Mr. Hincks. The transaction was
handled by Mr. Hincks' agent and business partner, Mr. Eric Glenn. Mr. Glenn was
the one who drafted the trust deed note in behalf of Mr. Hincks'. Shortly after the
transaction was made the note was subordinated to the Plaintiff.

* The note stipulates that the $13,500.00 with a 5.7% per annum interest on the unpaid
balance be paid in three balloon payments on the following dates;
$4,000.00 2/1/1992
$4,000.00 2/1/1997
$5,500.00 (together with accrued interest) 2/1/2002

* The note is quite specific about the amounts of the balloon principle payments and the
dates they are to be paid. It is also clear that all accrued interest is to be paid at the
time of the last balloon payment.

* Nowhere in the note is there any specific amounts of "interest only" payments prior
to the last balloon payment.
The ambiguous part of the note is that it makes mention of "Semi-Annual Payments",
but it does not stipulate any amounts nor does it identify if the "payments" were to be
made toward the principal, interest, or a combination of the two.

* The Defendants made 6 payments of approximately $384.75 each at various times. It
was the Defendants contention that said payments were paid towards the principle
amount of the first balloon payment in the note and that they were optional since no
amount is specified by the note. The Plaintiffs contention was that said payments were
"interest only" payments and that the note went into default when the payments
stopped.
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* The Defendants motioned for a Summary Judgment which was denied by Judge
Sawaya on 2/13/92

* The case was set for a non-jury trial before Judge Sawaya on 9/22/92

* In the pretrial Conference on 9/14/92, Judge Sawaya acknowledged that the note was
very ambiguous but said that the court could only assume what the intent of the note
was. Judge Sawaya told the Defendant in the presence of the Plaintiffs Council that if
he (the Defendant) did not work out a settlement with the Plaintiffs prior to the trial, he
(Judge Sawaya) would have to rule in favor of Plaintiffs in Court.

* The Defendents did not try to settle with the Plaintiffs because they knew that the
Plaintiffs had little if any motivation to agree to a fair settlement since he knew he
would win in Court based on the comments of the Judge.

* Although no new evidence was produced during the pretrial, the Plaintiffs
resubmitted a motion for summary judgment which was granted by Judge Sawaya on
10/22/92

* The Defendants motioned to Amend Judgment on 10/27/92 based upon the
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision.

* Motion to amend judgment by the Defendants was denied by Judge Sawaya on
11/23/92
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SUMMARY ARGUMENT

1- THE NOTE DID NOT EXPRESSLY REQUIRE THE PAYMENT OF ANY
CERTAIN AMOUNT UNTIL THE FIRST BALLOON PAYMENT WAS DUE
FEBRUARY 1, 1992. SAID BALLOON PAYMENT WAS MADE BY THE
DEFENDANT BUT REJECTED BY THE PLAINTIFF. BY RULING IN FAVOR OF
THE PLAINTIFF, THE COURT WENT OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF THEIR
JURISDICTION AND "REWROTE" THE CONTRACT TO PROVIDE A SPECIFIC
AMOUNT OF "INTEREST ONLY SEMI-ANNUAL PAYMENTS".

2- THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT RELATING TO THE EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE THAT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

3- BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTY WITH RESPECT TO THE VAGUE AND
QUESTIONABLE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONTRACT, IT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN RESOLVED AGAINST THE PARTY WHO HAS DRAWN THE
AGREEMENT.

4- BY "ASSUMING" THE INTENT OF THE NOTE, RENDERING A FINAL
VERDICT DURING THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND GRANTING A
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AFTER HAVING ONCE DENIED SAID
MOTION, JUDGE SAWAYA SHOWED PERSONAL BIAS AND PREJUDICE AND
MADE A PROCEDURAL BREACH.
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5- THE DEFENDANT HAS ACQUIRED EVIDENCE PREVIOUSLY
UNAVAILABLE TO THE COURT INDICATING THAT ERIC JOHNSON, THE
DRAFTER OF THE NOTE DID NOT INTEND TO HAVE SPECIFIC AMOUNTS
OF INTEREST ONLY SEMI-ANNUAL PAYMENTS.

ARGUMENT

1- THE NOTE DID NOT EXPRESSLY REQUIRE THE PAYMENT OF ANY
CERTAIN AMOUNT UNTIL THE FIRST BALLOON PAYMENT WAS DUE
FEBRUARY 1, 1992. SAID PAYMENT WAS MADE BY THE PETITIONER BUT
REJECTED BY THE RESPONDENT. THE COURT HAS REWRITEN THE
CONTRACT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.

An objective reading of the language of the Note reveals that the first payment called
for is a $4,000.00 principal payment on February 1, 1992. It is true that the Note does
refer to "semi-annual payments commencing August 1 and February 1 semi-annually",
however, the Note does not state the amount of any such payments nor does it state
whether such payments constitute payment of principle or interest.

By ruling in favor of the Respondent, the Court rewrote the contract to provide for a
certain payment "amount" and rewrote the contract to stipulate that said payment was
an "interest only" payment. The judgment of the Court was not supported by law or
facts. Indeed, it is not for a Court to rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at
arms length or to change the bargain indirectly because of supposed equitable
principles. Dalton v. Jerico Construction Co., 642 P2d 748 (Utah 1982). Respondents
predecessor dictated the terms of the Note and then had his agent draft the Note. The
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Respondent must live with the terms of the Note without outside intervention from the
Court.

2. EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS AN AMBIGUITY IN THE NOTE, THERE
ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WHICH
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Alternatively, the Court may have found that the Note is sufficiently ambiguous as to
warrant the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence relevant to determining whether
the Note requires any certain semi annual payment. However, there are questions of
fact which should have precluded any summary judgment in this case.

"Summary judgment is appropriate... when there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. " Winegar v. Froerer
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). "Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a
question of law. "Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108; Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah division of
State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990); Gordon v. CRS Consulting
Engineers, 820 P2d 492 (Utah App 1991)

" A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies.'" Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108 (quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); C J . Realty v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah App. 1988)

In this case there were significant questions of fact regarding the extrinsic evidence
which the Respondent had proffered in their motion papers or which they may have
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introduced at trial. At a minimum, the Petitioner was entitled to an opportunity to
respond to the evidence which may have been put forth by the Respondent, to cross
examine any witnesses and to produce additional extrinsic evidence for consideration by
the Court.

3. AT BEST, THE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WAS INCONCLUSIVE AND THE
NOTE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSTRUED AGAINST ITS DRAFTER

Once ambiguity has been found in a contract, and extrinsic evidence is deemed
inconclusive, irrelevant, or unavailable, a court still uncertain as to the intention of the
parties should construe ambiguities against the drafter of the contract. Wilburn, 748
P.2d at 585; see Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982); 17A AM. Jur. 2D
Contracts & 339 (1991).

It is a fundamental principle of contract law that "any uncertainty with respect to
construction of a contract should be resolved against the party who hajs} drawn the
agreement." Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982).

In this case the Respondents did not produce any relevant extrinsic evidence regarding
the intent of the parties. Their "extrinsic evidence" consisted of an affidavit of one of
the Plaintiffs who was not even a party to the original contract and had no part
whatsoever in the negotiation or drafting of the Note. The extrinsic evidence posited by
the Respondent was profoundly inconclusive, and the Note should have been construed
against its drafter, the Respondents predecessor in interest.
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4. BY RENDERING A FINAL VERDICT DURING PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE, JUDGE SAWAYA SHOWED PERSONAL BIAS AND PREJUDICE
AND MADE A PROCEDURAL BREACH.

As mentioned under "Applicable Facts" in this docketing Statement, in the Pre-Trial
Conference, Judge Sawaya acknowledged that the note was ambiguous but said that the
court could only assume what the intent of the note was. He told the Petitioner in the
presence of the Respondents Council that if he did not work out a settlement with the
Respondent prior to the trial, he, (Judge Sawaya) would rule in favor of the Respondent
at trial.

According to the rules of Pre-Trial Conference (1.08 (7)) See also the enclose "Order
for Pre-Trial Settlement Conference and for Appearance of Counsel and Parties"
document which was issued by the Third District Court. "The purpose of Pre-Trial
Conference is to effect a settlement of the case". In addition to "Settlement", "Other
problems such as withdrawal of counsel, failure to respond to discovery, witness
problems, trial conflicts, requests for continuences, etc, will be resolved at the
conference".

It is not the purpose of the Pre-Trial Conference to render a verdict in the case prior to
the Trial Date. By rendering a premature verdict in favor of the Respondent, Judge
Sawaya greatly hindered the Petitioners' potential ability to negotiate any kind of a
reasonable settlement, therefore the Respondent made no attempts at settlement. Such
biased actions on the part of Judge Sawaya constitute a serious breach of Judicial
Procedure.
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5. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HAS SURFACED THAT CLARIFIES THE
MEANING AND INTENT OF THE NOTE, SHOWING THAT NO INTEREST
PAYMENTS WERE INTENDED TO BE PART OF THE CONTRACT.

The Petitioner has just recently obtained a copy of another Note that was drafted by the
same agent, Mr. Eric Glenn, using the same Trust Deed Note Form. It was drafted
about two weeks earlier than the note at issue was drafted. In this particular Note, the
parties agreed upon specific "interest" payments with a specified "amount". This note
provides evidence that the drafter of the Note at issue was knowledgeable and
competent enough to have specified if the payments were to have been a "specified
amount" towards "interest".

CONCLUSION

Based upon the five above mentioned Issues of Appeal, the Petitioners, Cory &
Arwella Curtis submit to the Utah Court of Appeals that the Summary Judgment
rendered by the Judge Sawaya is not supported by the Law or Facts for the following
reasons;
1- The Note does not expressly require any specified interest payments to be made
prior to the last balloon payment and the Court has no authority to rewrite the contract
improvidently, at arms length, after the fact.
2- A Summary Judgment is inappropriate in this case because there was significant
and genuine issue of material fact. The Petitioner is entitled to an opportunity to
respond to the evidence at trial for consideration by the Court.
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3- At best, the extrinsic evidence was inconclusive and the Note should have been
construed against it drafter.
4- By rendering a Pre-Trial Verdict, the Judge committed a serious break of
Judicial Procedure.
5- Additional evidence has surfaced that could not have been made available to the
Court at the time of trial. This evidence proves that the drafter had previously drafted a
Note with specific "Interest" payments in specified "amounts". The drafter was
therefore knowledgeable and competent enough to have made these types of
specifications had there been an agreement between parties to do so.
The Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests this court to reverse the district court's
grant of the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the case for trial on
the merits previously stated.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the forgoing Notice, postage
prepaid, by U.S. Mail, this 7th day
of June, 1993 to the Plaintiffs;
William Christopulos and-Hvira Christopulos
C/O Kyle W. Jon$s
Beneficial Life
36 South State,
Salt Lake
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August 1, 1987
Cory and Arwella Curtis
4284 S. Albright Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124

Dear Cory and Arwella Curtis,
As

you

are

aware, the

August 1, 1987. The amount due

first payment on your note is due
$384.75.

The remainder of the

payments are due as follows:

1.

Aug. 1, 1987

$384.75

16.

Feb. 1, 1995

$270.75

2.

Feb. 1, 1988

$384.75

17.

Aug. 1, 1995

$270.75

3.

Aug. 1, 1988

$384.75

18.

Feb. 1, 1996

$270.75

4.

Feb. 1/ 1989

$384.75

19.

Aug. 1, 1996

$270.75

5.

Aug. 1, 1989

$384.75

20.

Feb. 1, 1997

$4,270.75

6.

Feb. If 1990

$384.75

21.

Aug. 1, 1997

$156.75

7.

Aug. 1, 1990

$384.75

22.

Feb. 1, 1998

$156.75

8.

Feb. If 1991

$384.75

23.

Aug. 1, 1998

$156.75

9.

Aug. If 1991

$384.75

24.

Feb. 1, 1999

$156.75

10.

Feb. 1, 1992 $4,384.75

25.

Aug. 1, 1999

$156.75

11.

Aug. If 1992

$270.75

26.

Feb. 1, 2000

$156.75

12.

Feb. If 1993

$270.75

27.

Aug. 1, 2000

$156.75

13.

Aug. 1, 1993

$270.75

28.

Feb. 1, 2001

$156.75

14.

Feb. If 1994

$270.75

29.

Aug. 1, 2001

$156.75

15.

Aug. If 1994

$270.75

30.

Feb. 1, 2002

$5,656.75

You might

want to keep this letter for your records so that

you may keep track ot your payments.
Please

make

the

checks

payable

to

William

and

Elvira

Christopolus.

Sincerely,
William and Elvira Christopolus
2742 Dearborn Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84106
(801) 467-3828

Mr. & Mrs. William Christopolus
2742 Dearborn St.
SLC Utah 84106

1/30/92

Dear Bill,
As you are aware, my first payment to you of $4,384.75 is
"" Saturday, February 1, 1992. Since my contention is that
I >iA not in violation of our agreement until said payment is
inY|pfault, please find enclosed, the unpaid portion of the
firpfc payment.
Contrary to your claims that I havfe made only four payments
to FJU, I have enclosed a copy of the sixth payment that I
madfef to you, which you deposited into your account on
03^9/90. It was check #810 for the amount of $384.75. I
have als©> sent a copy to the court and to your attorney.
£his makes the remaining portion of the first payment as
follows;
$4,384.75
-2,308.50

Total first payment amount
Minus six payments previously paid

$2,076.25
payment.

Enclosed remaining portion of total first

I am expecting you to return the enclosed check since your
contention is that the agreement has already been broken and
have chosen to take legal action. I have enclosed a self
addressed envelop for that purpose.

***WARNING***
By cashing or depositing the enclosed payment, you are
accepting the first payment of $4,384.75 as being PAID IN
FULL!! If the check is not returned, cashed, or deposited
within 15 days of the due date, I will stop payment on it.
Sincerely, / •

eory Curtis

CORY R. CURTIS

11-84 ^ V f e ^ S f t S 5
^ f t ^ © ? ^

OR ARWELLA CURTIS
j ^
168 WEST CENTER STREET 801 295-8985
NORTH SALT LAKE, UT 84054
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TRUST DEED

NOTE

) NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

s

13,500.00 .

.?.A.^...^?.^...9..1..,:^.f...y.t:».ll

February I

FOR VALVE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly

i<£?..

and severally, promise to pay to the order of

DARRELL B. HINCKS

13,500.00

•H1RTEEN THOUSAND, FIVE HUNDRED AND NO/100

DOLLARS ($

),

>gether with interest from date at the rate of.J.}y.L.$..P2L}.99.
per cent (.£:..?....%) per annum on
ic unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: .
,
..
r
*
'Semi-annual p a y m e n t / commencing August 1, and February 1, ^ e m i - a n n u a l l y .
$ 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p r i n c i p a l b a l a n c e due February 1 , 1992
$ 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p r i n c i p a l b a l a n c e due February 1 , 1 9 9 7 .
$ 5 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 p r i n c i p a l t o g e t h e r w i t h a c c r u e d i n t e r e s t , due and p a y a b l e on or b o l o r e
February 1, 2 0 0 2 . This n o t e may be p a i d e a r l y w i t h o u t uny p e n a l t y .
Early f u l l
payment of t h e e n t i r e n o t e w i l l be s u b j e c t t o a payment based on $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a t
107, i n t e r e s t d e d u c t i n g any payments made.
If payment i s not r e c e i v e d w i t h i n 15 days a f t e r due d a t e , a 5% l a t e f e e of monthly
E^ r pa S v L m m ^^
the balance to the reduction of principal Any
tuch installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of...£l/A
—~
....—..per
cent (...*!/.*..%) per annum until paid.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
a reasonable attorney's fee,
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
waivers or niodificatioos that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the irelease of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.
4284 South A l b i r g h t D r i v e
**THIS TRUST DEED

ONE TIME ONLY
A REFI
PA

Arwella Curtis

-¥> ^

»*

Q/\I^

*
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<5«MPiVNY

BE SUBORDINATED
A SECOND OR ON
MENT OF BOTH

TRUST DEED NOTE

T-112045

NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE:

When paid, this nott, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered

to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

Salt^Ljake^C^y A ^U e tah

|5,000.00

January 20

j ~ 87

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of
WILLIAM CHRISTOPULOS and ELVIRA CHRISTOPULOS, his wife as joint tenants
"with'Tu'n* *r^

FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100

:

~

:

"

~

=

-

™

^

).

together with interest from date at the rate of .T?M
per cent* (:. ..*. %) per annum on
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:
interest commences January 1, 1987.
$100,00 or more each month commencing February 1, 1987, and $100.00 or more
each month thereafter on the 1st day of each month until the entire principal
balance together with interest is paid in full.

Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of
per
20 0
cent (......*.....%) per annum until paid.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
U this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with
M without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
i reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
ind notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
vaivers or modifications that.may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note U secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.
6733 South 1560 East
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84121
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